














beginning	 of	 2014.	 Real	 names	 are	 used	 when	 the	 material	 is	 drawn	 from	 archival	





It	 is	 1	 April	 2001,	 in	 far	 western	 Oklahoma,	 warm	 beneath	 the	 late	 afternoon	 sun.	
Highway	Patrol	 Trooper	C.L.	 Parkins	 is	 about	 80	 kilometres	 from	 the	border	of	 Texas,	
watching	 trucks	 and	 cars	 speed	 along	 Interstate	 40.	 The	 speed	 limit	 is	 around	 110	
kilometres	per	hour,	and	just	then,	his	radar	clocks	a	blue	Toyota	Corolla	going	135	kph.	
The	driver	is	not	wearing	a	seatbelt.		





just	barely	remember	even	having	him	 in	my	car.	You	stop	so	many	people	that	 if	 […]	
you	 don't	 arrest	 them	 or	 anything	 […]	 you	 don't	 remember	 too	much	 after	 a	 couple	
months”	(Clay	and	Ellis).	Nawaf	Al	Hazmi	had	a	valid	California	driver’s	license,	with	an	
address	 in	San	Diego,	and	the	car’s	registration	had	been	legally	transferred	to	him	by	
his	 former	 roommate.	 Parkins’s	 inquiries	 to	 the	 National	 Crime	 Information	 Center	













In	 July,	 Khalid	Al	Mihdhar,	 the	 previous	 owner	 of	 the	 car,	 returned	 from	abroad,	 and	
joined	Al	Hazmi	in	New	Jersey.	The	two	were	boyhood	friends,	and	they	went	together	
to	 a	 library	 several	 times	 to	 look	 up	 travel	 information,	 and	 then,	 with	 Al	 Hazmi’s	
younger	brother	Selem,	to	book	their	final	flight.	On	11	September,	the	three	boarded	
American	Airlines	flight	77	as	part	of	the	Al	Qaeda	team	that	flew	the	mid-sized	jet	into	
the	 west	 façade	 of	 the	 Pentagon.	 They	 died	 along	 with	 the	 piloting	 hijacker,	 all	 the	
passengers,	 and	125	people	on	 the	 ground.	 Theirs	was	one	of	 four	 airplanes	hijacked	
that	day,	 one	of	which	was	 crashed	by	passengers,	 the	others	 into	 significant	 sites	of	
American	 power,	 by	 men	 who	 had	 been	 living	 for	 varying	 lengths	 of	 time	 all	 but	
unnoticed	in	the	United	States.		
No	one	thought	that	Trooper	Parkins,	or	the	other	officers	with	whom	the	9/11	hijackers	
crossed	 paths,	 should	 have	 acted	 differently.	 The	 Commissioner	 of	 the	 Oklahoma	
Department	 of	 Public	 Safety	 himself	 commented	 that	 the	 trooper	 “did	 the	 right	
thing”		at	that	April	traffic	stop.	And	yet,	interviewed	by	a	local	newspaper	in	January	of	





“Hijackers	 Timeline	 (Redacted).”	 CC	 BY-SA	 4.0	 2015	 by	 author,	 using	 the	 Federal	 Bureau	 of	
Investigation	(FBI)’s	“Working	Draft	Chronology	of	Events	for	Hijackers	and	Associates”.	







the	 law	 were	 “missed	 opportunities”	 to	 thwart	 the	 9/11	 plot	 (Kean	 and	 Hamilton,	
Report	 353).	 Among	 a	 certain	 set	 of	 career	 law	 enforcement	 personnel,	 particularly	
those	active	 in	management	and	police	associations,	 these	missed	opportunities	were	
fraught	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 personal	 failure.	 Yet,	 in	 short	 order,	 they	 were	 to	 become	 a	
source	of	professional	revelation.		
The	 scenarios—Trooper	 Parkins	 and	 Al	 Hazmi,	 other	 encounters	 in	 other	 states,	 the	
general	 fact	 that	 there	 had	 been	 chance	 meetings	 between	 police	 officers	 and	 the	
hijackers—were	re-imagined	in	the	aftermath	of	9/11.	Those	moments	were	returned	to	
and	 reversed,	 so	 that	multiple	 potentialities	 could	 be	 seen,	 beyond	 or	 in	 addition	 to	
what	had	taken	place.	The	deputy	director	of	an	intelligence	fusion	centre	told	me	in	an	
interview,	 “it	 is	 always	 a	 local	 cop	 who	 saw	 something”	 and	 he	 replayed	 how	 the	
incidents	 of	 contact	 had	 unfolded	 with	 the	 men.	 These	 scenarios	 offered	 a	 way	 to	




government’s	 “national	 intelligence”	 strategy.	 Previously	 a	 division	 had	 been	marked	
between	foreign	and	domestic	intelligence.	While	the	phrase	“national	intelligence”	had	
long	been	used,	notably	 in	National	 Intelligence	Estimates,	after	9/11	 it	became	more	
significant.	The	overall	director	of	 the	US	 intelligence	community	became	the	Director	
National	 Intelligence,	 for	 instance,	 and	 the	 cohesive	 term	 marked	 the	 way	 that	
increasingly	 diverse	 institutional	 components,	 types	of	 data	 and	 forms	of	 action	were	
evolving	to	address	the	collection	of	data	and	intelligence	production	(McConnell).	
In	 a	 series	 of	 working	 groups	 mobilised	 by	 members	 of	 major	 police	 professional	
organisations,	 and	 funded	 by	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 career	 officers	 and	
representatives	 from	 federal	 agencies	 produced	 detailed	 recommendations	 and	 plans	
for	 involving	 police	 in	 the	 new	 Information	 Sharing	 Environment.	 Among	 the	 plans	
drawn	 up	 during	 this	 period	was	 what	 would	 eventually	 come	 to	 be	 the	 Nationwide	
Suspicious	Activity	Reporting	 Initiative,	built	principally	 around	 the	 idea	of	encounters	
such	as	the	one	between	Parkins	and	Al	Hazmi.	












of	 those	 encounters,	 and	 the	 kinds	 of	 larger	 plots	 to	which	 they	were	 understood	 to	
belong,	 in	 order	 to	 extract	 a	 set	 of	 concepts:	 categories	 of	 suspicious	 “activities”	 or	
“patterns	of	behaviour”	corresponding	to	the	phases	of	a	terrorism	event	in	the	process	
of	 becoming	 (Deleuze,	 Negotiations).	 This	 conceptualisation	 of	 terrorism	 was	
standardised,	so	that	it	could	be	taught,	and	applied,	in	discerning	and	documenting	the	
incidents	comprising	an	event’s	phases.		
In	 police	 officer	 training,	 the	 various	 suspicious	 behaviours	 were	 called	 “terrorism	
precursor	activities”	and	were	divided	between	criminal	and	non-criminal.	 “Functional	
Standards,”	 developed	 by	 the	 Los	 Angeles	 Police	 Department	 and	 then	 tested	 by	 the	
Department	of	Homeland	Security	 (DHS),	 served	 to	 code	 the	observed	behaviours	 for	
sharing	 (via	 compatible	 communication	 protocols)	 up	 the	 federal	 hierarchy	 and	 also	
horizontally	between	states	and	regions.	In	the	popular	parlance	of	videos	made	for	the	
public	by	local	police	departments	and	DHS,	which	would	come	to	populate	the	internet	







mechanism	 through	 which	 the	 eyes	 and	 ears	 of	 everyone	 could	 contribute	 to	 their	




coordinated	 in	 the	 Information	 Sharing	 Environment.	 Drawing	 on	 reports	 thus	
generated,	the	Federal	Government	would,	in	theory,	communicate	timely	information	
on	security	threats	to	law	enforcement	so	that	they	would	be	better	able	to	discern	the	
incidents	 to	 be	 reported.	 The	 cycle	 aimed	 to	 catch	 events	 in	 emergence,	 in	 a	
distinctively	anticipatory	strategy	of	counterterrorism	(Stalcup).	
III.	Re-imagination	
A	 curious	 fact	 emerges	 from	 this	 history,	 and	 it	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	 how	
this		 initiative	developed.	That	 is,	 there	was	nothing	suspicious	 in	 the	encounters.	The	
soon-to-be	 terrorists’	 licenses	 were	 up-to-date,	 the	 cars	 were	 legal,	 they	 were	 not	
nervous.	 Even	Mohamed	 Atta’s	warrant	would	 have	 resulted	 in	 nothing	more	 than	 a	
fine.	It	is	not	self-evident,	given	these	facts,	how	a	governmental	technology	came	to	be	
designed	from	these	scenarios.	How––if	nothing	seemed	of	immediate	concern,	if	there	











turns,	 bad	 choices	made	 between	 existing	 dichotomies	 (90):	 liberty-security,	 security-
privacy,	ordinary-suspicious.	 It	 is	to	say,	what	were	the	possibilities	and	how	could	we	
have	 selected	 the	 correct	 one?	 Such	 questions	 seek	 to	 retrospectively	 uncover	
latencies—systemic	or	 structural,	 human	error	 or	 a	moral	 lapse	 (71)—but	 they	 ask	of	
those	latencies	what	false	understanding	of	the	enemy,	of	threat,	of	priorities,	allowed	a	
terrible	thing	to	happen.		







so	 that	 as	 the	 trooper’s	 traffic	 stop	was	 revisited,	 it	 also	 became	 a	way	 of	 imagining	
what	 else	 might	 have	 been.	 As	 Immanuel	 Kant,	 among	 others,	 points	 out,	 “the	
productive	 power	 of	 imagination	 is	 […]	 not	 exactly	 creative,	 for	 it	 is	 not	 capable	 of	
producing	a	sense	representation	that	was	never	given	to	our	faculty	of	sense;	one	can	
always	 furnish	 evidence	 of	 the	 material	 of	 its	 ideas”	 (61).	 The	 “memory”	 of	 these	
encounters	 provided	 the	 material	 for	 re-imagining	 them,	 and	 thereby	 re-virtualising	
history.			
This	was	different	than	other	governmental	responses,	such	as	examining	past	events	in	
order	 to	 assess	 the	 probable	 risk	 of	 their	 repetition,	 or	 drawing	 on	 past	 events	 to	
imagine	 future	 scenarios,	 for	 use	 in	 exercises	 that	 identify	 vulnerabilities	 and	 remedy	
deficiencies	 (Anderson).	 Re-imagining	 scenarios	 of	 police-hijacker	 encounters	 through	
the	 question	 of	 “what	 if?”	 evoked	 what	 Erin	 Manning	 calls	 “a	 certain	 array	 of	
recognizable	 elastic	 points”	 (39),	 through	 which	 options	 for	 other	 movements	 were	
invented.	The	Suspicious	Activity	Reporting	Initiative’s	architects	 instrumentalised	such	




Suspicion	was	 identified	as	a	key	affect,	one	which,	 if	 cultivated,	 could	offer	a	way	 to	
effectively	deal	not	with	binary	right	or	wrong	possibilities,	but	with	the	potential	which	
lies	 nestled	 in	 uncertainty.	 The	 “signs	 of	 terrorism”	 (that	 is,	 categories	 of		 “terrorism	
precursor	 activities”)	 served	 to	 maximise	 receptivity	 to	 encounters.	 Indeed,	 it	 can	
apparently	create	an	oversensitivity,	manifested,	 for	example,	 in	police	surveillance	of	
innocent	 people	 exercising	 their	 right	 to	 assemble	 (Madigan),	 or	 the	 confiscation	 of	
photographers’s	equipment	(Simon).		
“What	went	wrong?”	and	“what	if?”	were	different	interrogations	of	the	same	pre-9/11	
incidents.	 The	 questions	 are	 of	 course	 intimately	 related.	Moments	where	 something	
went	wrong	are	when	one	is	likely	to	ask,	what	else	might	have	been	known?	Moreover,	





day,	 reported	 that	 “the	 most	 important	 failure	 was	 one	 of	 imagination”	 (Kean	 and	






govern	 them,	and	because	 the	ways	 to	address	 those	 threats	had	been	not	 imagined,	
they	were	discounted	as	matters	for	intervention	(29).		
O’Malley	and	Bougen	argue	that	one	effect	of	9/11,	and	the	general	rise	of	incalculable	
insecurities,	 was	 to	 make	 it	 necessary	 for	 the	 “merely	 imaginable”	 to	 become	
governable.	 Images	of	 threats	 from	 the	mundane	 to	 the	extreme	had	 to	be	 conjured,	
and	 then	 imagination	 applied	 again,	 to	 devise	 ways	 to	 render	 them	 amenable	 to	
calculation,	 minimisation	 or	 elimination.	 In	 the	 words	 of	 the	 9/11	 Commission,	 the	
Government	must	bureaucratise	imagination.		
There	 is	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 this	 led	 to	 more	 of	 the	 same.	 Re-imagining	 the	 early	
encounters	reinforced	expectations	for	officers	to	do	what	they	already	do,	that	is,	to	be	
on	 the	 lookout	 for	 suspicious	 behaviours.	 Yet,	 the	 images	 of	 threat	 brought	 forth,	 in	
their	mixing	of	memory	and	an	elastic	“almost,”	generated	their	own	momentum	and	
distinctive	 demands.	 Existing	 capacities,	 such	 as	 suspicion,	 were	 re-shaped	 and	
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